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Background: The Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative and Tackling Indigenous 
Smoking Measure were both announced by the Australian Government at a time 
when its rhetoric around the importance of evidence-based policy making was strong. 
This article will (1) examine how the Rudd Government used evidence in Indigenous 
tobacco control policy making and (2) explore the facilitators of and barriers to the use 
of evidence.
Methods: Data were collected through (1) a review of primary documents largely 
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Commonwealth of Australia) 
and (2) interviews with senior politicians, senior bureaucrats, government advisors, 
Indigenous health advocates, and academics. Through the Freedom of Information 
Act process, 24 previously undisclosed government documents relevant to the 
making of Indigenous tobacco control policies were identified. Interviewees (n = 31, 
response rate 62%) were identified through both purposive and snowball recruitment 
strategies. The Framework Analysis method was used to analyze documentary and 
interview data.
results: Government policy design was heavily influenced by the recommendations pre-
sented in government authored/commissioned literature reviews. Resulting policies were 
led by equivocal evidence for improved tobacco control outcomes among Indigenous 
Australians. Many of the cited studies had methodological limitations. In the absence 
of high-quality evidence, some policy makers supported policy recommendations that 
were perceived to be popular among the Indigenous community. Other policy makers 
recognized that there were barriers to accumulating rigorous, generalizable evidence; in 
the absence of such evidence, the policy makers considered that the “need for action” 
could be combined with the “need for research” by introducing innovative strategies and 
evaluating them.
Discussion: Despite the absence of high-quality evidence, the formulation and adop-
tion of Indigenous tobacco policy was neither irrational nor reckless. The decision to 
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inTrODUcTiOn
“Evidence-based policy” has become a synonym for “good 
policy,” prompting the observation that “[i]t is difficult to 
imagine anyone arguing that policy should be based on 
anything but the best available evidence” (1). In a critical 
analysis of literature relating to the use of evidence in health 
policy making, Oliver et al. noted that the majority of studies 
made normative assumptions that policies should be based on 
evidence, and that any barriers between evidence and policy 
ought to be overcome (2). However, few of the studies used 
empirical data to demonstrate why evidence-based policy mak-
ing is superior to other forms of decision-making. Similarly, 
only a small number of studies provided in-depth empirical 
descriptions of the importance of evidence relative to other 
considerations.
Numerous models and theories conceptualize evidence as 
just one part of a broader scheme of competing influences on 
policy. For instance, Walt and Gilson considered that the content 
of health policies is affected by an interplay between context (e.g., 
culture, economic factors, demography, history, ideology), actors 
(i.e., individuals, groups, or organizations and their position in 
the power hierarchy), and the process through which policy issues 
are communicated, negotiated, and decided (which can include 
the consideration of evidence) (3, 4).
A contemporary adaptation of this model is Lin’s description 
of health policy as the product of three competing rationalities 
(5). “Cultural rationality” is defined as “values, ethics, what 
(perceived) societal opinions feel is right in relation to health 
policy” and thus aligns with what Walt and Gilson term “context” 
(5). “Political rationality” relates to the process through which 
power is exercised and decisions are made and includes such 
factors as “the willingness of policymakers to have transparent 
processes and be accountable, the ability of interest groups to 
participate … and the role of commentators (be it media, experts, 
or lobbyists)” (5). Finally, “technical rationality” describes the 
knowledge produced by researchers and can include diverse 
forms of evidence, such as epidemiology and economics (5). Lin 
argues that these rationalities (and the policies that they create) 
are shaped by “historical political legacies” and reflect “ongoing 
processes of social learning” (5).
In view of such rich theoretical explanations, Oliver et al. call 
for a new research agenda, which focusses on the “influences on 
and processes of policy” through in-depth, empirical descriptions 
of how evidence “fits with the other drivers and triggers that affect 
policy” (2). This article uses the development of tobacco control 
policies for Indigenous Australians as a case study for examining 
the real-world tensions inherent in the health policy-making 
process.
When the Labor Party assumed government in 2007 under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Indigenous Australians 
were expected to have lives that were 17 years shorter than their 
non-Indigenous counterparts (6). The Labor Party argued that 
such enduring disparities were a product of ineffective, ideologi-
cally driven policies and that “from here on our guiding principle 
will be the evidence of what works and what does not work in 
reducing disadvantage” (7).
The Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative and Tackling 
Indigenous Smoking Measure committed over AUD 120 million 
in government funds and marked the beginning of a period “that 
has seen more action on Indigenous smoking than any other 
time in our history” (8). Yet, perhaps surprisingly, in light of 
the foregoing context, it was said of some aspects of the policies 
that “the government hasn’t produced evidence to back up its 
campaign” (9).
This article will (1) examine how the Rudd Government used 
evidence in Indigenous tobacco control policy making and (2) 
explore the facilitators of and barriers to the use of evidence rela-
tive to other factors.
In so doing, this article reveals difficulties in the application of 
evidence-based policy making. These difficulties include debates 
as to what constitutes “evidence” and a tension between the need 
for good evidence and the need for urgent policy action. The arti-
cle also demonstrates how, in some circumstances, the need for 
evidence of effectiveness can be exceeded by the need to empower 
the target population in the decision-making process.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Data were collected through a combination of document reviews 
and interviews. The overarching purpose of data collection with 
respect to each method is set out in Table 1 below. Data collec-
tion and subsequent analysis were informed by awareness of the 
possibility that key factors might turn out to relate to “context/
cultural rationality” and “political rationality/process” as much 
as “technical rationality.”
It is considered prudent to combine these two methods when 
conducting policy process analyses to mitigate their respective 
limitations (4, 10). These limitations include the fact that (1) some 
important events in policy processes are often not recorded, or the 
documents may be withheld from public access; (2) documents 
can possess official and perhaps incomplete versions of events; 
(3) respondents may underrepresent or overrepresent their role 
in a policy process; and (4) the passage of time might impede a 
adopt an innovate and evaluate strategy was justifiable given (a) the potential for the gap 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous health outcomes to worsen in the absence of 
an imminent policy response; (b) the existence of circumstances, which made it difficult 
to obtain high-quality evidence to guide policy; and (c) the need for policy solutions to 
reflect community preferences, given sociohistorical sensitivities.
Keywords: aboriginal health, policy making, evidence-based policy, tobacco, indigenous health, policy analysis, 
smoking cessation
TaBle 1 | summary of goals of data collection, by method.
Method
g
o
al
s
Document review interviews
Identify key policy actors to be included in the interview sample (purposive 
and snowballing)
Understand the content of relevant 
Indigenous tobacco control policies 
and aspects of how those policies 
were made in order to inform the 
interview questions
Obtain information to piece together an account of how the Indigenous 
tobacco control policies were made
Corroborate and fill in gaps in findings obtained through other methods of 
data collection
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respondent’s ability to recall events accurately or with sufficient 
detail (10).
Documentary Data collection
A two-stage process was adopted to identify relevant documents. 
In the first instance, publicly available documents were obtained 
by searching the following websites/databases:
• Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) (“Publications” 
and “Media Release and speech archive” sections only);
• Australian Indigenous HealthInfoNet (“Policies” and 
“Tobacco” sections only);
• Tobacco Control Supersite (“Australian Tobacco Timeline” 
section only);
• National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Equality 
Council;
• National Preventative Health Taskforce;
• Australian National Council on Drugs;
• Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy;
• Intergovernmental Committee on Drugs;
• Quit;
• Factiva (Australian national newspapers).
Where search functions were available, the search was limited 
to items containing the search terms “(Aboriginal OR Indigenous) 
AND (tobacco OR smok*).” Where search functions were not 
available, items were individually screened by title for relevance. 
Relevant documents were limited to those produced between 
2007 (election of Rudd Government) and 2008 (announcement 
of policies).
The second-stage of the document review was focused on 
obtaining relevant documents produced for the private use of 
members of the policy-making community. These documents 
were either provided by the interview respondents or accessed 
under the federal Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI).
The initial request (FOI Request 309-112) for “written reports/
letters of advice and internal reports or memoranda used by the 
Government to inform the design of the Indigenous Tobacco 
Control Initiative” resulted in an estimated charge of AUD 
10,845 for the time that FOI officers and document custodians 
would likely spend searching for, retrieving, and assessing the 
documents. Further particularized requests were then submitted 
(FOI Requests 006-1314 and 067-1213) seeking access to the 
following:
• minutes of meetings held between December 2007 and 20 
March, 2008 in which the Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative 
was discussed;
• minutes of any meetings relevant to the selection of the first 
six multicomponent projects funded as part of the Indigenous 
Tobacco Control Initiative in 2008–09;
• minutes of meetings held between December 2007 and 
December 2008 in which the tobacco elements of the National 
Partnership Agreement on Closing the Gap in Indigenous Health 
Outcomes were discussed;
• any research commissioned before December 2008 to inform 
the Tackling Smoking Measure specifically;
• memoranda or advice prepared between December 2007 
and 20 March, 2008 in which the Indigenous Tobacco Control 
Initiative is mentioned;
• memoranda, advice, or briefing papers drafted before 
December 2008 in which the Tacking Indigenous Smoking 
Measure is mentioned.
The revised requests yielded 24 previously undisclosed 
documents relevant to the making of the policies. One document 
was not disclosed on the basis that it was produced for Cabinet 
deliberations and therefore exempt under the legislation.
interview Data collection
Interview participants were recruited through a combined 
purposive and snowballing sampling strategy, as recommended 
for studies of this nature (10, 11). A preliminary list of individu-
als involved in the policy-making process was created using 
the documents described above. These purposefully selected 
respondents were asked to name other people who influenced 
the policy process in relation to Indigenous tobacco control.
Fifty potential respondents were invited to participate in 
interviews. A source population of 50 policy actors was consid-
ered reasonable, given that the study was limited to two specific 
policies. Thirty-one individuals agreed to participate in the study, 
representing a response rate of 62%. The response rate is consist-
ent with those obtained in other studies of the public services 
sector (12).
The sample comprised advisors to the Federal Minister for 
Health (n = 2), senior Federal politicians (n = 2), senior Federal 
health bureaucrats (n =  4), members of and assistants to the 
National Preventive Health Taskforce and its Tobacco Working 
Group (n = 9), members of the National Indigenous Drug and 
Alcohol Committee (n = 2), researchers/academics (n = 4), and 
Indigenous health advocates (n = 8). Anonymity was guaranteed 
to protect reputations and interests. Of those individuals who 
did not respond to or declined interview invitations, four were 
politicians, seven were government advisory group members, one 
was a senior bureaucrat, four were researchers, and three were 
Indigenous advocates.
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Interviews 
were semi-structured, using a combination of open-ended and 
probing questions. Topic guides were prepared before each 
interview and were tailored to the knowledge and experience 
TaBle 2 | Themes and subthemes coded for data analysis.
Themes subthemes
Political priority Why Indigenous smoking historically not prioritized
Factors explaining rise in prominence in 2008
• Evidence
• Other (open coding)
Process – how policies 
made/adopted
Descriptions at each level
• National Preventative Health Taskforce Tobacco 
Working Group level
• Department of Health level
• Ministerial level
Role of evidence
Role of other factors (open coding)
Evidence Amount available
Quality available
Appropriateness/applicability to policy question
Barriers to use (open coding)
Facilitators to use (open coding)
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of each respondent. Where relevant, respondents were asked to 
describe the following:
• factors that might explain the policy attention given to 
Indigenous tobacco control under the Rudd Government;
• how the policies were developed;
• factors that might explain why certain approaches to tobacco 
control were prioritized over others;
• the role of evidence in the policy process;
• facilitators of and barriers to the use of evidence.
Ethics approval was granted by relevant committees at the 
University of Oxford (Ref: SSD/CUREC1/12-013) and Deakin 
University (Ref: 2012-218).
Data analysis
Data were analyzed using the Framework Analysis method. The 
process involved (1) becoming familiar with the data by listening 
to/transcribing the recordings and reading the transcripts and 
documents; (2) noting down recurring themes and subthemes 
(see Table  2 below); (3) using QSR International’s NVivo 10 
software to code the data according to the themes; (4) transfer-
ring the coded data into charts (one for each theme), which were 
organized in rows by source and in columns by subtheme; and 
(5) looking down the chart columns to observe recurring patterns 
and tensions.
resUlTs
The role of evidence in getting 
indigenous Tobacco control on the 
agenda
There had long been evidence to indicate high rates of Indigenous 
smoking. A 1994 survey of over 15,700 Indigenous Australians 
found that 49.7% of respondents over the age of 13 years smoked 
daily (13). Similarly, a survey conducted a decade later (2004–05) 
found that 50% of Indigenous Australians aged 18 years and over 
(n = 10,439) were current daily smokers, compared to 23% of the 
general population (14).
Despite these data, there had been an absence of significant 
government investment specifically geared toward reducing 
Indigenous smoking rates prior to 2008 (15). For instance, an 
expenditure analysis revealed that smoking was a focus in only 2 
and 3% of Indigenous-specific alcohol and other drug interven-
tion projects in 1999–2000 and 2006–2007, respectively (16).
The interview findings suggest that the increased political 
attention given to Indigenous smoking in 2008 was the product 
of a confluence of three factors – namely – (1) the publication 
of evidence showing that tobacco was the single largest con-
tributor to the “gap” between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
health outcomes; (2) the success of the Closing the Gap advocacy 
campaign, which was led by Indigenous and civil society groups 
and supported by the incoming Labor Government; and (3) the 
appointment of a Health Minister committed to tobacco control, 
perhaps best evidenced in the Rudd Government’s decision to 
make Australia the first country in the world to introduce a law 
to mandate plain cigarette packaging.
Burden of Disease Study
Six respondents cited a burden of disease study by Vos et  al. 
published in 2007 (hereafter, the Vos study) as an explanation 
for why Indigenous smoking became more politically prominent 
in 2008 (17). The study found that, of 11 risk factors, tobacco 
was the largest single contributor to both the overall Indigenous 
disease burden (12%) and the health “gap” between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australians (17%) measured in disability-
adjusted life years.
One senior bureaucrat said of the Vos study, “the study was so 
important.” The significance of the Vos study was that it “show[ed] 
people what were the contributing factors to excess mortality” 
(senior bureaucrat). An Indigenous leader and health advocate, 
recalled that Vos’ work prompted an Indigenous research organi-
zation to focus on smoking:
[The Cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Health] put briefings together and all 
that and started to tell their story to the Minister … And 
then they did this presentation in Parliament House. 
Within a fortnight [the Government] found $14 million.
The presentation to which the respondent referred formed 
part of the Parliamentary Showcase of Aboriginal Health 
Research, which was held in March 2008 and opened by the 
Health Minister. As part of the program, Viki Briggs of the 
Centre for Excellence in Indigenous Tobacco Control (CEITC) 
delivered a presentation entitled “Reduce Smoking, Reduce the 
Gap” in which the findings of the Vos study were highlighted 
(18). Another respondent considered that “that was probably an 
absolutely crucial event” (Indigenous tobacco control academic). 
A Ministerial advisor considered that the event “helped crystal-
lise the view that tobacco was a critical factor.”
The “Closing the Gap” Movement
Four respondents were of the view that the impact of the Vos study 
must be considered in its sociopolitical context. The study was 
published in 2007 at a time when the Closing the Gap campaign for 
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Indigenous and non-Indigenous equality was gaining momentum 
(19). In the lead up to the 2007 Federal election, the Labor Party 
made a commitment to improve Indigenous social and health 
outcomes in response to the Closing the Gap campaign.
Evidence demonstrating the impact of smoking on the gap 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous health outcomes found 
fertile ground in this sociopolitical landscape. According to a 
senior politician:
[W]hile the strong research helped galvanise people 
around [Indigenous tobacco control] I don’t think it was 
the cause or catalyst for action … [T]he very successful 
campaign around Close the Gap … helped create politi-
cal momentum and interest – the research is vital in this 
context but could’ve gone unnoticed without the broader 
campaign.
Similarly, a senior bureaucrat explained that a “catalyst” for 
political action “was that we had a figure, a statistic that said 
smoking causes 20% of all mortality. It came at the same time as 
Closing the Gap. So, okay, to close the gap … you’ve got to prevent 
premature mortality.” A Ministerial advisor agreed that “we were 
never going to achieve this [aim to close the gap in health outcomes] 
if we didn’t do something about Indigenous smoking.”
Political Leadership
While the confluence of evidence and political agendas created a 
positive environment for Indigenous tobacco control to become 
more politically salient, four respondents emphasized the crucial 
role of the Health Minister in actually securing policy action. It 
was noted that DoHA’s interest in Indigenous tobacco control 
predated the policy developments in 2008 but that, despite this, 
the issue never gained political attention. According to a senior 
bureaucrat, “[w]henever we put a case around a smoking interven-
tion, every minister would say, ‘yeah, well who the hell’s going to 
run it because they [Aboriginal health staff] all smoke anyway?’”
By contrast, the new Health Minister, Nicola Roxon, was 
described as someone who understood and championed the 
importance of Indigenous tobacco control. A Government advi-
sor explained that the “bottom line is Nicola Roxon … got it and 
put money into it” (Tobacco Working Group member). Similarly, 
an Indigenous leader and health advocate was of the view that 
“you can put it [policy action] down to a couple of people in the 
Minister’s office and the Minister herself. She was committed to 
saying, ‘if that’s what the evidence is telling us, we need to put a 
bigger effort into here.”
role of evidence in the Design of the 
Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative
Both interview data and documents obtained under FOI 
confirmed that DoHA played a lead role in the design of the 
Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative, which occurred over a 
short period of time due to political and organizational pres-
sures. A Ministerial advisor noted “there was a sense that after the 
Apology [to the Stolen Generations in February 2008] that … [the] 
goodwill created by that needed to be translated into some sort of 
firm commitments” (Ministerial advisor).
The Indigenous Health Equality Summit was scheduled to 
take place in Parliament House in March 2008 and was expected 
to culminate in the signing of a partnership agreement between 
government and non-government organizations to achieve health 
equality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. 
The interview data suggested that the Prime Minister had 
expressed an intention to attend the event, and that this served 
as a catalyst for the development of the policy. A Ministerial 
advisor said:
I do remember this being an example where we were kind 
of going, ‘Ergh! I think the PM might want to announce 
something’ … [A]s I say, it was all a little bit chaotic in 
those early days. So it meant that a lot of the sort of detailed 
policy development was done at the Departmental level 
more so than at the Ministerial level.
Media reports, to which the respondent referred, revealed that 
the Health Minister had been dissatisfied with unrealistic time 
pressures imposed by Prime Minister Rudd (20). According to 
the Ministerial advisor, “the Department [of Health and Ageing] 
sort of came up with this bunch of proposals and said, ‘look … we’ll 
give you something to announce at this event.’”
The Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative was announced by 
Prime Minister Rudd at the Indigenous Health Equality Summit. 
Through the Initiative, the Government committed AU$14.5 
million over 4 years to:
• train Indigenous health staff in smoking-cessation strategies;
• trial innovative community interventions, including culturally 
appropriate communication activities, in five or six pilot sites; 
and
• support Indigenous tobacco control research to “help build the 
evidence base around what works” (21).
One of the documents obtained under FOI was a literature 
review (dated June 2007) authored by an employee of DoHA 
Program Management and Evaluation Unit. The review proposed 
five policy options, four of which seem to have been incorporated 
into the Initiative developed by DoHA – namely:
• offer support and training for local health staff to deliver brief 
tobacco cessation interventions and programs that include 
nicotine replacement therapy;
• provide more intensive interventions in targeted communities/
regions;
• develop media campaigns featuring local identities or 
artwork;
• fund the CEITC to audit evaluations of tobacco control 
initiatives.1
Table 3 below contains the studies cited in DoHA review to 
support each policy proposal and provides a summary of their 
major findings and relevant limitations.
1 Department of Health and Ageing. Tobacco Control and Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Australians. Internal Document Obtained under Freedom of 
Information Act 1982. (2007).
TaBle 3 | summary of studies cited in Doha (see text footnote 1) review in support of policy proposals.
Policy 
proposal
supporting 
evidence cited in 
Doha review
Type of evidence relevant finding(s) limitations
Smoking-
cessation 
training for 
health staff
Ivers (22, 23) • Systematic review of published and 
unpublished studies on Indigenous 
Australian tobacco control initiatives
• Review found one study by Harvey et al. 
(27), which used pre- and post-test 
interviews to evaluate a 1-day workshop 
that provided 34 employees in three 
Indigenous health-care settings with training 
in motivational interviewing and the stages 
of change model for addressing addictive 
behaviors
• Evaluation produced no evidence that any 
staff or clients has given up smoking at the 
6-month follow-up
• Some evidence that training led some staff to 
reassess their own smoking status
• Small sample
• Staff turnover and availability 
meant that pre- and post-
interview participants were 
not identical
Adams and Briggs 
(24)
• Descriptive review of role of 
government and non-government 
organizations in Indigenous tobacco 
control
• Only referred to Harvey et al. study (27) 
described above
Lindorff (25) • Survey of 67 health staff
• Focus groups with 275 participants 
from health services, legal centers, 
women’s centers, men’s groups, drug 
and alcohol rehabilitation centers, 
school staff, resource centers, 
employment programs, elders groups, 
and university students and staff
• 62% of a survey sample wanted more 
tobacco training
• Some participants in focus groups 
“emphasised the need for more training if 
staff were to deal with tobacco on a day-to-
day basis… Staff training was also seen as 
an opportunity to prompt staff into thinking 
about their own smoking”
• Small sample of health 
service staff
Ivers et al. (26) • Pre-and post-study with matched 
controls
• Three remote Indigenous communities 
received government grant to 
implement multicomponent tobacco 
control interventions, and three 
communities were chosen as matched 
controls
• Multicomponent interventions included 
health worker training, as well as 
introduction of smoke-free public 
places policies, tobacco education 
programs, provision of nicotine 
patches, and point-of-sale restrictions
• Found no decreases in smoking prevalence 
1-year post-intervention
• One intervention community experienced a 
statistically significant decrease in the amount 
of tobacco consumed (based on store sales 
figures) after 1 year
• Percentage of smokers who reported thinking 
about quitting/taking action increased 11% 
after 1 year
• Percentage of smokers aware of the risks of 
lung cancer and heart disease increased 5% 
after 1 year
• Intervention communities 
were self-selected
• Less than one quarter 
of residents across the 
intervention communities 
participated in surveys at both 
baseline and follow-up
• Not possible to ascertain 
the effects of training relative 
to other components of 
intervention
Provide 
intensive 
community 
interventions
Ivers et al. (26)
Adam and Briggs 
(24)
• Pre- and post-study with matched 
controls (see above)
• Descriptive review (see above)
• See above
• Describes a randomized control trial involving 
eight north Queensland communities 
with interventions including event support 
programs, school-based tobacco education, 
quit support groups, brief intervention in 
health services, etc.
• No findings from randomized controlled trial 
presented
• See above
• N/A
Local media 
campaigns
Lindorff (25) • Focus groups with 275 participants 
from a range of groups (see above)
• Focus group participants mentioned that 
desirable features of health promotion 
resources included use of Indigenous 
languages, Indigenous faces, pictures, 
simple language, video and radio 
media, music, interactive resources, 
and television advertisements featuring 
Indigenous people
• Sampling bias – report 
notes that “[i]t was quite 
difficult to assure people 
that the groups were not 
going to be a lecture about 
quitting tobacco … As a 
result a number of potential 
participants chose not to take 
part in the groups, many of 
who were smokers”
(Continued)
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Policy 
proposal
supporting 
evidence cited in 
Doha review
Type of evidence relevant finding(s) limitations
Adam and Briggs 
(24)
• Summarizes an unpublished evaluation 
of a program that incorporated some 
culturally specific social marketing 
strategies (use of local Indigenous 
identifies)
• 151 Indigenous people randomly 
approached in street and asked 
exposure and recall questions
• 22% had heard the radio advertisement with 
13% recall
• 10% had seen car/bus advertisement with 
5% recall
• Study was restricted to 
recall; effect on knowledge or 
tobacco use not discussed
Ivers (23) • Systematic review (see above) • Review found one evaluation of a non-
Indigenous anti-smoking campaign [Murphy 
and Mee (28)]
• Evaluation data obtained through 15 focus 
group discussions with 42 Indigenous adults, 
20 Indigenous teenagers, and 23 community 
and health workers recruited across four 
locations
• Found that “the groups gave no indication that 
awareness of, or exposure to, the campaign 
was any different among indigenous and 
non-indigenous populations. Similarly, the 
results … gave no reason to believe that 
indigenous people received the campaign 
messages any differently to the non-
indigenous population” [Murphy and Mee (28)]
• Evaluation contained no 
description of methods by 
which participants were 
recruited and data were 
analyzed
Support 
research into 
Indigenous 
tobacco 
control
Ivers (22, 23)
Unknown
• Systematic review (see above)
• Unpublished recommendations from a 
2005 Indigenous smoking workshop 
convened by DoHA
• Found only four evaluations of tobacco 
interventions for Indigenous Australians, none 
of which assessed smoking cessation as an 
outcome
• Workshop recommended the development 
and implementation of a research program 
around Indigenous smoking
• N/A
• Unclear how 
recommendations developed
TaBle 3 | continued
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role of evidence in the Design of the 
Tackling Indigenous Smoking Measure
The second major Indigenous tobacco control policy – the Tackling 
Indigenous Smoking Measure – formed part of the Council of 
Australian Governments’ National Partnership Agreement on 
Closing the Gap in Indigenous Health Outcomes, which was signed 
in December 2008 (29).
The interview data suggest that DoHA played a key role in 
the development of this policy also. According to a Ministerial 
advisor, “the Department developed the proposals that we kind 
of further refined in cooperation with them I guess.” Interviews 
with DoHA staff confirmed the central role of the Department in 
designing the policy and also highlighted the informal influence 
of external advisors. A senior bureaucrat recalled:
In the early stages of [determining] ‘well, what do we 
do?’ we talked to the Centre for Excellence in Indigenous 
Tobacco Control [CEITC] … and we had conversations 
with them initially about ‘well, we’ve got money to do X 
and Y and Z, if you could do something what do you think 
needs to be done?’
DoHA also commissioned CEITC to draft a literature review 
and a scoping paper to inform its response to Indigenous smoking 
rates. The resulting paper was provided to DoHA in September 
2008.
Additionally, advice on the formulation of the policy was 
received from the National Preventative Health Taskforce. The 
National Preventative Health Taskforce was established by the 
Government to assist in the development of strategies to prevent 
diseases related to tobacco, alcohol, and obesity. While the 
Taskforce did not release its final recommendations until 2009, 
a Government report revealed that interim advice was provided 
in 2008 (30). According to a member of the Taskforce’s Tobacco 
Working Group, “[t]hey involved us in the development of the 
Tackling Smoking Initiative …  We were doing the same recom-
mendations formally and informally.” The Director of CEITC was 
a member of the Tobacco Working Group.
The formal recommendations published by the Tobacco 
Working Group reproduced almost verbatim the recommenda-
tions contained in the literature review and scoping paper drafted 
by CEITC for DoHA (31). The relevant recommendations in the 
CEITC paper were to
• increase the Indigenous tobacco control workforce;
• improve health worker access to appropriately designed 
training;
• improve access to pharmacotherapies;
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• develop a well-researched and focus-tested Indigenous-
specific social marketing campaign at national and local levels;
• raise the profile of Quitlines to Indigenous communities (32).
These recommendations closely aligned with the Tackling 
Indigenous Smoking Measure, which committed AUD 100.61 
million to reduce Indigenous smoking rates and the burden of 
tobacco-related disease through a number of initiatives, the most 
prominent of which were the following:
• establish a national network of tobacco action coordinators;
• develop a national Indigenous tobacco action training pro-
gram for health workers and community educators;
• strategies to improve delivery of smoking-cessation services, 
including nicotine replacement therapy;
• social marketing campaigns to reduce smoking-related harms 
among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples;
• enhance Quitline to provide culturally sensitive services (29, 33).
Table 4 below summarizes the evidence cited in the CEITC 
paper to support each policy proposal and notes major findings 
and limitations of each.
rationale for adopting Policy Proposals in 
the absence of strong evidence
It is clear from Tables 3 and 4 that not all of the policy initiatives 
were grounded in strong evidence demonstrating their likely 
effectiveness. A critical analysis of the studies revealed that 
many had limitations, such as inadequate reporting of meth-
ods, selection bias, response bias, and small sample sizes. Most 
Indigenous Australian studies measured subjective preferences 
for interventions, perceptions of likely impact of interventions, 
or thoughts and attitudes about smoking. In the absence of rig-
orous evidence from the Australian context, some reliance was 
placed on studies of indigenous populations in other countries. 
Interviews were used to understand why the policy makers 
TaBle 4 | summary of studies cited in ceiTc paper in support of policy proposals.
Policy proposal supporting 
evidence cited in 
ceiTc review
Type of evidence relevant finding(s) limitations
Specialist 
Indigenous 
tobacco control 
workforce
Wood et al. (34); 
Zandes et al. (35); 
Murphy and Mee 
(28); Mark et al. 
(36); Karen and 
Walker (37)
• Qualitative studies • Generalist Indigenous health workers 
were reluctant to provide smoking-
cessation advice because they did not 
want to “add to the other health and 
social problems and make them feel 
bad about themselves” and did not 
want to appear hypocritical on account 
of their own smoking status
• N/A
Market Equity (38) • Qualitative study based on interviews 
with 15 “key intermediaries involved in 
Indigenous health related to smoking”
• Some respondents felt that there 
needed to be a team of Indigenous 
people working in Indigenous smoking 
prevention programs
• Small sample
• Sampling strategy not clear
• Nature/content of interviews 
unclear
Tobacco action 
training
Lancaster and 
Fowler (39)
• Cochrane systematic review • No strong evidence that training health 
professionals to provide smoking-
cessation interventions has an effect on 
quit rates
• N/A
Harvey et al. (27) • Pre- and post-test interviews
• 34 Indigenous health service 
employees were provided with training 
in motivational interviewing and the 
stages of change model for addressing 
addictive behaviors
• No evidence that any staff or clients 
has given up smoking at the 6-month 
follow-up
• Some evidence that training led some 
staff to reassess their own smoking 
status
• Small sample
• Staff turnover and availability 
meant that pre- and post-
interview participants were not 
identical
Improved 
access to 
pharmacotherapy
Stead et al. (40) • Cochrane systematic review of 
randomized trials in which nicotine 
replacement therapy was compared 
to placebo or no treatment or where 
different doses were compared
• 132 trials were identified for inclusion
• Nicotine replacement therapies increase 
the rate of quitting by 50–70%
• No studies from Indigenous 
contexts identified
Hughes et al. (41) • Cochrane systematic review of 
randomized trials comparing 
antidepressant medications to placebo 
or an alternative pharmacotherapy for 
smoking cessation
• 52 trials were identified for inclusion
• Bupropion and nortriptyline aid long-
term smoking cessation, but selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors do not
• No studies from Indigenous 
contexts identified
Holt et al. (42) • Randomized, placebo-controlled, 
double-blind parallel group study of 134 
Maori smokers who consumed more 
than 10 cigarettes per day
• At 3-month follow-up, the rates of 
continued abstinence in the bupropion 
and placebo groups were 44.3 and 
17.4%, respectively
• At 12-months, corresponding figures 
were 21.6 and 10.9%
• Did not recruit the projected 
141 participants required 
to detect difference in 
proportions between groups 
at an α value of 0.05 with 
80% power
(Continued)
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Policy proposal supporting 
evidence cited in 
ceiTc review
Type of evidence relevant finding(s) limitations
Robles et al. (43) • Systematic review of studies evaluating 
the use of smoking-cessation 
pharmacotherapies in non-white 
populations in USA
• Nine studies were identified for inclusion 
(six related to black smokers, one 
related to Hispanic smokers, one related 
to Native American smokers, and one 
related to a group of white and non-
white smokers)
• For smokers in the Native American 
study (n = 252), self-reported abstinence 
rates were 31% (49/156), 30% (21/71), 
24% (13/55), and 21% (4/19) at 3, 6, 9, 
and 12 months, respectively
• Potential for response bias in 
Native American study
Campbell et al. (44) • Community-based tobacco intervention 
trial conducted over 1 year in five 
intervention sites and three control 
sites in predominately Indigenous 
communities in North Queensland
• Intervention comprised six components 
(school education, brief intervention 
training, assistance to develop 
smoke-free workplace policies, event 
support program, support group, 
and enforcement of tobacco sales 
restrictions)
• Household surveys of self-reported 
tobacco use conducted at baseline and 
1-year post-intervention
• Modest effect on self-reported daily 
tobacco use and mean number of 
cigarettes smoked weekly at follow-
up in intervention communities; 
non-significant declines in control 
communities
• Potential for response bias
• Impact of pharmacotherapy 
relative to other components 
of the intervention not clear
Richmond et al. (45) • Prospective study in a maximum security 
prison
• A total of 31 participants (Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous) received two brief 
cognitive behavioral therapy sessions, 
nicotine replacement therapy, bupropion, 
and self-help resources
• Biomedically validated point prevalence 
and continuous abstinence measured at 
6-month follow-up
• At follow-up point, prevalence was 26% 
and continuous abstinence rates were 
22%
• Those who relapsed or continued 
smoking smoked less than at baseline
• Small sample size
Ivers et al. (46) • Pre- and post-test interviews with 34 
Indigenous smokers who self-selected 
to receive free nicotine patches and a 
brief intervention, and a further 59 who 
chose to receive brief intervention only 
(receiving advice, viewing a flip chart, 
and being offered a pamphlet)
• At 6-month follow-up, 15% of the 
nicotine patch and brief intervention 
group reported that they had quit 
smoking (10% with biochemical 
validation) compared to 1% 
(biochemically validated) of the group 
that elected brief intervention only
• Small sample size
• Participants assigned to 
groups through self-selection
Karen et al. (47) • Prospective study in which 32 
Indigenous individuals were exposed to 
a multicomponent intervention providing 
the opportunity to sign up for Quitline 
and receive weekly phone calls from the 
service, access to nicotine replacement 
therapy and Zyban, general practitioner 
consultations, and access to a Quit 
facilitator and educator
• 19% quit rate • Impact of pharmacotherapy 
relative to other components 
of the intervention not clear
• Small sample size
Indigenous-
specific social 
marketing 
campaigns
Murphy and Mee 
(28)
• 15 focus group discussions with 
42 Indigenous adults, 20 Indigenous 
teenagers, and 23 community and 
health workers recruited across four 
locations
• Found that “the groups gave no 
indication that awareness of, or 
exposure to, the campaign was any 
different among indigenous and non-
indigenous populations. Similarly, the 
results … gave no reason to believe 
that indigenous people received the 
campaign messages any differently to 
the non-indigenous population”
• Evaluation contained no 
description of methods by 
which participants were 
recruited and data were 
analyzed
TaBle 4 | continued
(Continued)
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Policy proposal supporting 
evidence cited in 
ceiTc review
Type of evidence relevant finding(s) limitations
Ivers et al. (48) • 351 (mostly Indigenous) people from a 
source population of 1,228 residents 
participated in a community survey at 
both baseline and 12-month follow-up
• Populations were exposed to 
multicomponent tobacco control 
interventions, including advertising
• 86% of smokers recalled seeing 
non-Indigenous anti-tobacco 
advertisements
• 10 people who claimed to be 
smokers at baseline visit had quit 
at follow-up
• Those who recalled seeing the 
advertisements were not significantly 
more likely to quit than those who 
did not
• Logistic regression showed that 
exposure to individual tobacco 
interventions was not associated with 
an increased chance of cessation 
during intervention year
• N/A
Wilson et al. (49) • Monthly Quitline call data and calls within 
1 h of a television commercial being 
shown were analyzed for 2002–2003
• Data on target audience rating points 
(TARPS) also used
• Mainstream commercial generated 115 
calls per 100 TARPS from Maori callers 
within 1 h of airing
• Maori-oriented commercial generated 
91 calls per 100 TARPS from Maori 
callers within 1 h of airing
• Did not measure actual 
impact on tobacco cessation
• Two campaigns not directly 
comparable as mainstream 
campaign was focused on 
tobacco control only, while 
Maori-oriented campaign 
included broader messages 
about health, well-being, and 
cultural identity
Enhanced 
Quitline services
Karen et al. (47) • Prospective study in which 32 
Indigenous individuals were offered a 
multicomponent intervention (see above)
• 19% quit rate
• Noted “a difficulty has been people 
expressing apprehension about 
receiving support through enrollment 
with Quitline. With encouragement 
to receive one call and give it a try all 
participants have used Quitline with to 
date no negative complaints voiced 
about the service”
• See above
Maher et al. (50) • Telephone survey of 1,312 callers 
(including n = 101 Native American/
Alaskan, n = 762 white) to a Quitline 
3 months after their initial call
• Analysis compared 7-day quit rates and 
satisfaction measures by race/ethnicity 
and other factors
• Seven-day quit rate was higher 
among Native American/Alaskan 
callers (35%) 3 months after the initial 
call, compared to white callers (30%) 
(p = 0.42)
• Native American/Alaskan callers 
reported high rates of service 
satisfaction
• Not clear whether any 
difference in response rates 
between Native American/
Alaskan and white callers
Hayward et al. (51) • Comparative study of utilization and 
effectiveness of Canadian quitlines 
among first-time callers who completed 
an evaluation and provided ethnic status 
(n = 7,082)
• A 6-month prolonged abstinence 
rate for Aboriginal men was 16.7% 
compared with 7.2% for Aboriginal 
women and 9.4 and 8.3% for 
non-Aboriginal men and women, 
respectively
• Findings cannot be assumed 
to be representative given that 
they are based on responses 
from only those who provided 
ethnic status and agreed to 
participate in the evaluation
TaBle 4 | continued
adopted the policy proposals in the absence of clear supporting 
evidence.
Impractical to Wait for Rigorous Indigenous-Specific 
Evidence
Faced with both a dearth of evidence and an understanding 
that Indigenous smoking rates were inexorably high despite 
the presence of mainstream tobacco control strategies, some 
policy makers saw the need to take action based on inference. 
An Indigenous tobacco control academic with close links to 
key policy makers noted that “the problem is we didn’t have 
any evidence from this [Indigenous] setting so … people had to 
make guesses. And they probably weren’t bad guesses.” A Tobacco 
Working Group member used similar language, describing the 
research conducted to develop policy priorities as “predomi-
nately guess-based.”
An innovate and evaluate approach was accepted as being an 
appropriate solution in the circumstances. Internal documents 
obtained under FoI demonstrate the extent to which policy mak-
ers considered that it was both necessary and justifiable to act 
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without a strong evidence base, so long as there was a commit-
ment to accumulating knowledge in the process:
Currently there is little available evidence for what 
works in Indigenous tobacco control. In partnership 
with research bodies … the Government can make an 
immediate start on building that evidence-base …
In tandem with the research program, it is proposed 
to run five or six pilot projects in selected locations to 
trial innovative approaches to smoking prevention and 
cessation …  Evaluation of these pilots could inform 
future phases of the initiative …
The approach recommended here combines action 
(the pilot programs) coupled with a strong research 
focus to ensure that resources are not wasted on mis-
directed initiatives.2
The alternative approach – that is, waiting for evidence 
to emerge before taking policy action – was not considered 
practical. Two policy makers noted that the Indigenous context 
presented distinct challenges to the conventional understanding 
of evidence-based policy making, arguing that evidence needed 
to play more of a back-end role. According to a Tobacco Working 
Group member:
[W]e need to look at ways of finding types of intervention 
that would resonate better with Aboriginal communities 
and I think a part of what came with that [was] also an 
acceptance that certainly when it comes to mainstream 
programs, it is driven by research … but … when it comes 
to Aboriginal smoking there’s a need to be willing to take 
a few more risks, and trial different ways of addressing 
the problem.
Researchers with links to policy makers expressed the view that 
the Indigenous research context presented distinct challenges. 
One respondent offered the following example of the limitations:
[T]he logistics of doing high level randomised controlled 
trials in [remote] populations … it’s ridiculous … There 
were a whole lot of issues with cross-contamination 
between communities … We did the numbers for a ran-
domised control trial in giving quit advice … the numbers 
to do a proper randomised control trial in the Northern 
Territory were going to be 30,000 participants. You 
couldn’t get it … (Indigenous tobacco control academic).
An Indigenous advocate with research experience added:
[T]here’s always challenges from the remoteness of 
going out to do the pre- and post-questionnaires …  a 
lot of these people move around in their communi-
ties … They will travel around and visit family and the 
2 Anonymous. Announcement of the Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative at 
the Close the Gap Indigenous Health Equality Summit 20 March 2008. Internal 
Document Obtained under Freedom of Information Act 1982. (2008).
neighbouring community. Could be anything … even the 
weather … From all those kind of logistic things, to even 
language being a barrier.
Policy Proposals Were Championed by Indigenous 
Representatives
Not all members of the policy community subscribed to the 
view that mainstream tobacco interventions were ineffective for 
Indigenous people, or that the Indigenous-specific interventions 
recommended in the CEITC paper were needed. One Tobacco 
Working Group member warned against “overdoing the differ-
ences” and noted that “Aboriginal people are people. They smoke 
like other people. They quit like other people. And I think we need 
to be almost wary of assuming that you need to have something 
incredibly and dramatically different.” Another Working Group 
member concurred, arguing that “there is absolutely zero evidence 
that those [mainstream] approaches do not impact Indigenous 
people in the same sort of was as they affect the rest of us.” 
Longitudinal studies lend some support for this view showing 
that, in the absence of major Indigenous-specific policies, daily 
smoking prevalence for Indigenous males over the age of 18 years 
decreased from 58.5% in 1994 to 52.6% in 2008 with a statistically 
significant annual decrease of 0.4% per year (52).
The apparent mismatch between the advice provided to 
Government and the view of some respondents that some 
Indigenous-specific interventions were not necessary was 
explained in the following way:
I know there would have been at least two or three people 
around the table who would have shared what I just 
said to you about ‘oh, god, do we really have to go down 
this …  culturally distinctive route?’ But I think in the 
scheme of things we didn’t feel that strongly about it to 
say, ‘listen, let’s just can that.’ Because I think that critique 
needs to come out of the Indigenous community rather 
than be given like Moses from above” (Tobacco Working 
Group member).
An expert government advisor agreed that, in light of the 
history of exclusion, Indigenous perspectives need to be incor-
porated into the policy process:
… [P]eoples outside of mainstream Australia have a 
right and should be involved in leading the progression of 
policy development around those marginalised popula-
tions … [I]t’s time for the policy developers in Australia 
to now say to Aboriginal Australians, ‘you must develop 
the policies and you must assist us on the pathways out’ 
(National Indigenous Drug and Alcohol Committee 
member).
Other members of the Tobacco Working Group confirmed the 
importance of ensuring that the policies were developed with and 
supported by Indigenous people:
[B]ecause of the awful history for Aboriginal people 
in this country there’s a real strong desire amongst 
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representatives of the Aboriginal community that you’ll be 
working with … wanting it to be Aboriginal-determined, 
controlled etc.
[A] lot of Aboriginal people were really keen on the 
idea of local workers. Would it be in my core program? 
Not necessarily. But if it’s the price we pay for getting 
Aboriginal people [to] support the rest of the program – 
willingly pay it.
DiscUssiOn
This case study has demonstrated empirically what the theoretical 
models of policy making suggest – namely – that evidence does 
not exist and cannot be used in a vacuum. Rather than viewing 
evidence as being in competition with other policy factors, this 
case study presents evidence as being dependent on them.
The intuitive appeal of evidence-based policy making lies in 
the perception of objectivity – evidence “speaks for itself ” (53). 
Certainly, the data suggested that evidence played an important 
role in getting Indigenous smoking onto the political agenda. 
The salience of the Vos burden of disease study was repeatedly 
described in interview responses and relevant documents (17). 
However, the findings show that while “[s]cience may be able to 
deliver empirical knowledge … this knowledge has to be inter-
preted and warranted in order to be understood” (54).
In this instance, there were two factors that enabled the 
evidence to “speak” in the policy process. First, the evidence 
emerged against the backdrop of a popular sociopolitical cam-
paign to reduce health disparities between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians; this aligns with both Walt and Gilson’s 
notion of “context” and Lin’s definition of “cultural rationality” 
as “what (perceived) societal opinions feel is right” (3, 5). 
Second, the evidence was understood and valued by key figures 
in Government (including the Minister for Health) who had the 
power to take action in response; this reflects the importance of 
“actors” and “process” in Walt and Gilson’s model, and “political 
rationality” in Lin’s schema (3, 5).
The symbiotic relationship between evidence and other 
policy factors was further demonstrated in the policy design 
stage. The recommendations presented in the government 
authored/ commissioned literature reviews (obtained under 
FoI) seem to have heavily influenced the content of the policies. 
In relation to the Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative, “politi-
cal rationality” and “context” seem to be major explanations for 
the fact that most of the recommendations emerging from the 
literature review were adopted in the policy. The political pres-
sure to make a major policy announcement at the Indigenous 
Health Equity Summit meant that policy proposals needed to be 
developed by DoHA within a short period of time. In this situ-
ation, the importance of the evidence seems, at least in part, to 
have been associated with its accessibility (the literature review 
was drafted internally by the Department in the previous year). 
The accessibility of research has been identified as a facilitator 
to evidence-based policy making in other studies (55–58).
Similarly, the Tackling Indigenous Smoking Measure closely 
reflected the recommendations in another literature review com-
missioned by DoHA and authored by the CEITC. Viewed through 
the prism of Walt and Gilson’s model of health policy making, 
the value that was placed on the CEITC’s research can be partly 
ascribed to the organization being regarded as a key “actor” in 
the policy community. If the policy community is conceptualized 
as a network of interconnected individuals and organizations, 
CEITC’s influence derived from its centrality in that network 
(59). DoHA provided CEITC with a majority of its funding with 
a view to building the evidence base in relation to Indigenous 
tobacco control and, as demonstrated in the interview data, relied 
on the organization for policy advice. Furthermore, the Director 
of CEITC was a member of the Tobacco Working Group, which 
was also consulted in the development of the policy. From the 
perspective of Lin’s model, “political rationality” overlapped with 
“technical rationality” in the sense that a research organization 
was invited into the decision-making process.
While it is clear that the tobacco control policies were 
developed based on evidence in the form of literature reviews, 
a critical analysis of the studies contained in those literature 
reviews revealed that many possessed methodological limita-
tions. The evidence relied on was equivocal as to whether 
the recommendations would lead to positive tobacco control 
outcomes for Indigenous Australians. The case study therefore 
highlights the importance of conceptual clarity when using the 
term “evidence-based policy.”
However, it does not follow that policies based on weak or 
equivocal evidence are “bad policies.” Far from being irrational 
or reckless, the interview data suggest that the policy makers’ 
acceptance of the policy proposals was based on logical reason-
ing, notwithstanding the absence of a rigorous evidence base.
Respondents noted the importance of other influences on 
the policy process, including the need to ensure that the poli-
cies had the support of members of the Indigenous population. 
Historically, policy making for Indigenous Australians has often 
been a top-down exercise associated with marginalization and 
disempowerment of the population. For instance, an inquiry into 
a controversial 2007 Indigenous policy initiative (the Northern 
Territory National Emergency Response) found that the policy 
“diminished its own effectiveness through its failure to engage 
constructively with the Aboriginal people it was intended to 
help” (60). For some of the policy makers in the present case 
study, there was a desire to avoid repeating mistakes of the past 
by ensuring that the needs and preferences of Indigenous people 
were captured in the design of the Indigenous Tobacco Control 
Initiative and Tackling Indigenous Smoking Measure.
Evidence cannot trump all other factors; rather it must coexist 
with other inputs in the policy process, including the “thoughtful 
identification and compassionate use of individual patients’ [or 
populations’] predicaments, rights and preferences” (61). This can 
be illustrated by another example from the Australian Indigenous 
health context. While there is a strong evidence base to support 
the use of dialysis for patients with renal failure, historically, many 
Indigenous patients living in remote areas refused treatment on 
the basis that it would involve spending extended periods of time 
in urban and regional centers, away from their family, culture, and 
land (62). Put simply, “an efficacious treatment cannot produce 
public health benefits if it is not adopted widely by its intended 
recipients” (63).
Ideally, solutions that are “acceptable” to the target population 
will also be supported by evidence of their likely effectiveness. 
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However, the Indigenous tobacco control case study demonstrates 
that there are situations in which it may be justifiable to introduce 
policies in the absence of high-quality evidence.
It has been noted that barriers to research in Indigenous 
contexts include
• the fact that the Indigenous Australian source population 
is small (670,000), meaning that sample populations in 
Indigenous-specific studies are also likely to be small, and 
only very large program impacts are likely to be statistically 
significant (64);
• Indigenous distrust of research on the basis that it was his-
torically associated with “the politics of colonial control” and, 
in the present day, can be perceived to be exploitative, stig-
matizing, or unresponsive to Indigenous needs and concerns 
(65–67); and
• the fact that, in order to be culturally sensitive, there is often 
a call for research in Indigenous communities to be participa-
tory, which can result in a conflict between “the values of the 
academic setting and those of the community” (65, 68).
The consequence is that “‘best’ evidence is often gathered on 
simple interventions and from groups that are easy to reach in 
a population,” and evidence from those that are harder to reach 
tends to be regarded as inferior (69).
This research bias is not unique to the Indigenous Australian 
context. It has been noted that low-income countries often 
have limited resources to invest in research, and cultural 
minorities within high-income countries are often excluded 
from research protocols because of the logistical and financial 
costs, such as those related to translation (70). With respect to 
tobacco control research, a systematic review of studies exam-
ining the effectiveness of NHS stop smoking services in the 
United Kingdom found there is currently a lack of high-quality 
research into the potential differential impact of interventions 
in other subpopulations, such as black and minority ethnic 
groups, despite qualitative and anecdotal evidence suggesting 
different beliefs and attitudes to smoking and smoking cessa-
tion (71).
Birch presents the potential resulting paradox of a “no action 
without supporting evidence” mentality thus:
If there is no evidence of effectiveness among the most 
deprived group… [e]fficient use of scarce resources… 
would imply the intervention not be given to these 
individuals with the anticipated increase in social 
inequalities in health. The resources of a health care 
system would become increasingly concentrated on 
less deprived populations. This results not necessarily 
because the problems of the more deprived groups are 
insoluble, but because the mechanisms we choose to 
evaluate for dealing with the observed problems are 
particularly suited to less deprived groups, i.e. it is a 
feature of the ‘service focus’ (72).
Applied to the Indigenous tobacco control context, a rigid 
adherence to the belief that there should be “no policy without 
evidence” could feasibly have resulted in a widening of the health 
gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians simply 
because there was more research to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of interventions in the latter population.
When the potential corollaries of the “no policy without 
evidence” approach are laid bare, the policy makers’ decision 
to adopt the Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative and Tackling 
Indigenous Smoking Measure in the absence of strong evidence 
is justifiable. The policies were not made with reckless disregard 
for what would work; instead, evidence from other settings and 
expert opinions were used to generate conceptually plausible 
responses to the policy problem in a manner that accommodated 
the apparent preferences of members of the Indigenous com-
munity. Moreover, the policy proposals were accompanied by 
a commitment to evaluate their effectiveness. This approach is 
consistent with that advocated by Sanderson, who suggests that 
policies should be viewed as hypotheses to be tested through 
pilots or trials and/or rigorous monitoring and evaluation (73).
In May 2015, the Government committed a further AUD116.8 
million to Indigenous tobacco control initiatives over 3  years 
(74). Future research needs to examine whether rigorous evalu-
ations of the Indigenous Tobacco Control Initiative and Tackling 
Indigenous Smoking Measure were conducted as planned and, if 
so, the extent to which lessons learnt have informed more recent 
policy developments.
In terms of theories of the policy process, this case study has 
provided clear evidence of the role of “context/cultural rational-
ity” and “process/political rationality” as having at least as much 
weight as “technical rationality” in understanding how this 
particular policy area evolved.
Furthermore, as this case study demonstrates, public health 
policy making does not always lend itself to the literal translation 
of rigorous research findings. More empirical case studies are 
needed to explore the role of other factors – such as the needs and 
preferences of the target population – in order to provide a clearer 
understanding of their relative importance in the policy process.
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